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The ideal judge in the 17th century: the example of  
Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco's Iudex Perfectus 
 
 
Cato van Paddenburgh* 
KULeuven  
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this contribution is to introduce Iudex Perfectus (1662), a little-known treatise on 
the qualities of the judge, and its writer, Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco, who had been a judge 
himself. It elaborates on the structure of the work and on the matter treated in relation to its 
subject, being the qualities of the good judge, with a focus on corruptibility. As this 
contribution is part of an ongoing research project, it hopes to yield a provisionary image of 
Álvarez de Velasco’s definition of the good judge.  
 
Keywords 
Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco, Iudex Perfectus, judge, Spanish Empire, corruption  
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
This contribution concerns Iudex Perfectus, seu de iudice perfecto, a treatise on the 
morality and qualities of ‘the good judge’ which was published by Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco 
in Lyon in 1662. Iudex perfectus seems to be one of a kind within the body of 17th century 
Spanish legal writing. It is a work dedicated to the qualities of the judge solely, and addresses 
an audience of judges too. Moreover, it was written by a secular writer who enjoyed a career 
as a jurist and judge himself. These qualities set it apart from other treatises on the judge, such 
as Iudex, magistratus, senator (1633), a treatise that also addresses the office of the judge from 
the angle of state organization which was written by Franciscus Zypaeus, a canonist affiliated 
to the university of Leuven, or from works of the de iustitia et iure genre, such as those by 
Leonardus Lessius, Luis de Molina and Johan de Lugo, which were all published in the early 
17th century. These were written by Jesuits from the perspective of moral theology and thus 
focus on the realm of conscience, and on settling cases in the court of conscience (forum 
conscientiae) or internal forum (forum internum).  
 
 
2. Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco  
 
We do not know much about the life of the author of Iudex perfectus, but what we do 
know is the following. Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco was a judge (oidor) in Santa Fe de Bogota 
at the Real audiencia del Nuevo Reino de Granada, the highest tribunal of the Spanish 
Viceroyalty of the Republic of New Granada, which was located in the very north of present-
day South America.1 Before that he may have been a patronus or lawyer at the chancellary of 
                                                 
* This contribution is part of an ongoing PhD research project at the department of Roman law and Legal 
History of KU Leuven, Belgium. Parts of its contents have been presented previously during the Belgisch-
Nederlands Rechtshistorisch colloquium which was held on 16-17 December 2016 in Maastricht, and during a 
seminar I gave on the Iudex Perfectus treatise on June 7th 2017 in Leuven. I would like to thank the attendants of 
these events for their valuable remarks, and I would like to thank prof. W. Decock especially for his contributions. 
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Valladolid, and at the royal court of Madrid.2 It is also known that Álvarez de Velasco resigned 
from his judicial duties when his wife died in 1649, to dedicate himself entirely to writing and 
charity. His son Francisco, who was a poet, described him as a devout, charitable and learned 
man, who assisted the poor on a daily basis.3 The works that Álvarez de Velasco published, 
next to a hagiographical account of his wife, are the following: De privilegiis pauperum, 
Madrid 1630-1636, on the special legal regime applicable to the poor and miserable, including 
poor debtors4; Axiomata et loca communia iuris, Lyon 1631, a compendium of principles and 
definitions in positive law; Epitoma de legis humanae mundique fictione, Lyon 1662, about the 
discrepancy between divine truth and the contrived nature of human legal systems5, and Iudex 
Perfectus, which was published in Lyon 1662.  
 Iudex perfectus was written in a period within the ius commune tradition, the mid-16th till 
mid-18th century, when all kinds of treatises were published, both theological and legal, that 
studied the connections between law and moral theology, and with that, between the forum 
internum and forum externum.6  
 
 
3. Forum internum and forum externum 
 
Let us take a closer look here at the phenomenon of the forum internum and forum 
externum. It should be understood that this notion of forum internum and externum was related 
to a distinct image of duality within human beings: the realm of the soul and that of the body 
were regarded as separate, each being assigned its own jurisdiction or forum: the body was 
given that of the forum externum, the soul that of the forum internum or forum conscientiae. 
The forum internum was where the cases of conscience were settled, and it was thus concerned 
with the salvation of the soul. The rights and obligations of persons in this realm were guarded 
and explained by the moral theologians.7 The judge as Álvarez de Velasco describes him can 
be seen as one uniting the forum internum and externum in his acting. He depicts the judge as 
‘iustitia animata’, or the embodiment of justice.  
 
Before we delve deeper into this, it should first be noted that, quite literally, no justice 
existed without the presence of the judge: the office of the judge concerned not only the 
                                                 
1 Decock, W., “Poor and Broke. Debtor Relief in Alvarez de Velasco's De privilegiis pauperum (1630)”, 
Rights at the Margins: Historical, Philosophical and Legal Perspectives (V. Mäkinen, J. Robinson, P. Slotte, H. 
Haara, eds.), forthcoming, p. 2, referring to Buxó, J.P., El poeta colombiano enamorado de sor Juana, Santafé de 
Bogotá 1999, p. 33. See also: Garriga, C. “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe 
Du Ius Commune. (Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, Valeurs, Représentations, Symboles (2014-2015) 
(DIKÈ Groupe de recherche sur les cultures juridiques en Europe, ed.), Toulouse 2016, p. 85.  
2 This is implied by the title page of Álvarez de Velasco’s Axiomata (1631) and Moréri, L., El Gran 
Diccionario Historico, Paris 1753, p. 456, but demands further research.  
3 Decock, “Poor and Broke. Debtor Relief in Alvarez de Velasco's De privilegiis pauperum (1630)”, p. 
2, referring to Buxó, El poeta colombiano enamorado de sor Juana, p. 34.  
4 On this treatise see also Duve, T., Sonderrecht in Der Frühen Neuzeit: Studien Zum Ius Singulare Und 
Den Privilegia Miserabilium Personarum, Senum Und Indorum in Alter Und Neuer Welt, Studien Zur 
Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte: Veröffentlichungen Des Max-Planck-Instituts Für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte 
Frankfurt Am Main 231, Frankfurt am Main 2008, p. 38.  
5 Decock, “Poor and Broke. Debtor Relief in Alvarez de Velasco's De privilegiis pauperum (1630)”, p. 
3.  
6 Turrini, M., “Recht und Theologie in der Neuzeit - einige Untersuchungsansätze”, Das Konzil von 
Trient und die Moderne (P. Prodi and W. Reinhard, eds.), Schriften des Italienisch-Deutschen Historischen 
Instituts in Trient 16. Berlin 2001, p. 201.  
7 Decock, W., Theologians and Contract Law the Moral Transformation of the “Ius Commune”, Ca. 
1500-1650. Leiden; Boston 2013, p. 27. 
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administration of justice, but the very determination of what justice was.8 The judge therefore 
combined his scientia, his knowledge, with his conscientia, his conscience, in order to 
determine what was just and right.9 Case by case, mediating between abstract legal principles 
and the particularities of cases, the judge had to decide what justice demanded. In doing this, 
judges were granted a lot more discretionary power and flexibility than we would allow for 
today.10 
 
Secondly, it has been remarked by Turrini that Álvarez de Velasco, a secular author, 
assigned a ‘sacral aura’ to the judge. For he considered him a minister of God, and united in 
him the two offices of the iudex (judge) and the sacerdos (priest), whereas theological sources 
strove to emphasize the differences between the two in order to preserve the duties of the 
sacerdos as exclusively religious. It is interesting to note that the analogy of the judge and the 
priest is still used quite frequently today for expressing that modern judges, especially 
constitutional ones, are those designated exclusively to reveal to us the truth of what the law 
holds for us, and that they are in this sense endowed with an almost divine task.11 
 
Álvarez de Velasco also stated that the judge’s decisions have a moral connotation. After 
all, the judge administers God and thus the quality of his morality and of his fear of God, from 
which this morality springs, are of vital importance for the quality of his judgements.12  
 
 
4. Alvarez de Velasco’s Iudex perfectus 
 
We will now take a look at the structure and wordings of the treatise. After the title page, 
which tells us that this work is in the first place dedicated to God, and secondly to all living 
and dead judges,13 follows another more explicit dedication to Jesus, who is in the end the 
‘Almighty Judge of the living and the dead’, and the ‘Lord of Justice’. Then comes the preface 
by means of a letter to the reader, in which the opening formula of the work is given. This 
address to the reader and, it can be argued, the basic premise of this work, is expressed by a 
five-and-a-half-page sequence of quotes of mainly Western and Eastern church fathers, such 
                                                 
8 See also Czeguhn, I., “Richterbilder und Richterkulturen in Spanien und Lateinamerika”, on this.  
9 Garriga, “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe Du Ius Commune. 
(Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, p. 79-80. See also Turrini, M., “Il giudice della coscienza e la 
coscienza del giudice”, Disciplina dell’anima, disciplina del corpo e disciplina della società tra medioevo ed età 
moderna (P. Prodi and C. Penuti, eds.), Bologna 1994, p. 280.  
10 Decock, “Poor and Broke. Debtor Relief in Alvarez de Velasco's De privilegiis pauperum (1630)”, 
referring to Meccarelli, M. “Arbitrium iudicis und officialis im ius commune: Ein Instrument für die Vermittlung 
zwischen einem allgemeinen Recht und der örtlichen Realität”, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung 115 (1998), pp. 553-565, and: Mohnhaupt, H., “Untersuchungen 
zum Verhältnis Privileg und Kodifikation im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert”, Historische Vergleichung im Bereich von 
Staat und Recht: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Ius commune: Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für 
europäische Rechtsgeschichte. Sonderhefte: Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 134, Frankfurt am Main 
2000, pp. 295-348. 
11 Dworkin, R. “The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1 (2003), p. 11; Legendre, P., L’empire de la vérité, Paris 1983, p. 51-52; Rigaux, F., La loi des 
juges, Paris 1997, p. 260 ; Jacob, R., La grâce des juges: l’institution judiciaire et le sacré en Occident. Paris 
2014, p. 498; Foqué, R., De ruimte van het recht, Arnhem 1992. I would like to thank Bart Nelissen (KU Leuven) 
here for his valuable suggestions, some of which can also be found in: Nelissen, B., “Deontologische Codes of 
Deugden Voor (te) Openhartige Magistraten?” Rechtskundig Weekblad 75, 18 (December 31, 2011), pp. 806–23. 
12 Turrini, “Il giudice della coscienza e la coscienza del giudice”, p. 284, and Garriga, “Iudex perfectus. 
Ordre traditionnel et justice de juges dans l’Europe du ius commune. (Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe siècle)”, 
p. 82.  
13 Vivorum et mortuorum iudici dicatus’ 
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as Gregory the Great, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Hildebert of Tours, 
John Chrysostom, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas a Kempis. Classical works are also 
quoted, such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics, Ovid’s Epistulae ex ponto, Pliny’s Naturalis 
Historia and his letters, Albius Tibullus, Quintilian and several works by Seneca. Álvarez de 
Velasco here refers to the Old Testament as well.   
 
The basic premise expressed in this preface holds that a judge need always strive for 
perfection, despite his fallible human nature. He writes that ‘the judge is the servant and 
executor of justice, and he is indeed the embodiment of justice itself.’14 Since the virtue of 
justice is perfect, so should be the judge. Thomas Aquinas statement, that ‘the best is he, who 
is least plagued by flaws’, is quoted here.15 But Álvarez de Velasco also makes it very clear 
that judges, as humans, will never be able to reach perfection, and that challenge and merit lie 
in an incessant striving for the goal of perfection itself.16 For it is with this striving that one 
may come closer to God, who is indeed the very embodiment of perfection. This aiming for 
perfection is also explained as the ambition to always go forward and never hesitate or stand 
still, as this could mean regression and falling into the trap of human weaknesses.17 In this 
sense, the aiming for the sublime seems to serve as a reminder or even support for the judge to 
use in times of temptation. In the treatise we find many examples of such temptations and 
challenges of judges’ rightness, as well as examples of desirable behaviour, which will make 
the somewhat abstract goal of reaching for ‘perfection’ more accessible and practically 
applicable.   
 
Before we delve deeper into the structure and contents of this work, this may be a good 
place to elaborate a little on how the role of the judge was perceived in Álvarez de Velasco’s 
time. For it might have become clear that the judge’s task was perceived wholly differently 
from the one he is understood to have today. In modern legal systems, the body of judges is 
often categorized along the lines of hierarchy (this concerns roughly judges of first instance, 
appellate judges and supreme court judges, next to those legal professionals involved in 
arbitration, mediation and alternative dispute regulation) and legal specialisms (public law, 
criminal law, private law, and within these, special chambers and judges treating cases in the 
field of intellectual property, real estate, economic crimes, immigration, and cases involving 
children etc.) But despite these finely distinguished legal fields of practice, the judge’s 
comportment today is regulated by general legal instruments that concern all judges within the 
jurisdiction, such as disciplinary rules and constitutional provisions stating the judge’s 
independence and impartiality. 
 
Though Álvarez de Velasco mentions canon, civil, and royal Spanish law next to the Old 
and New Testament as sources for his work, no disciplinary or legal rules for judges to 
prescribe how judges were to behave seem to have been provided for in his time, and what is 
more, the body of judges in the Spanish empire was extremely fragmented and functioned in a 
                                                 
14 ‘… quia cum iustitiae minister et executor, ipsa imo quidem iustitia animata, iudex ipse sit: perfectus 
esse debet.’ 
15 ‘Optimus ille est, qui minimis urgetur’, Horace, Satires, lib. 1, 3.  
16 ‘Nusquam ergo et nunquam perfectio (hic)’, Bernardus of Claivaux, Soliloq. C.7. 
17 ‘Licet lubricum sit iter per quod incedis, tamen de Domini auxilio confidens, desere ima quantum 
vales, et summa pete. Non deficias, neque tepescas, ut gradum Perfectionis posis ascendere,’ Bernardus of 
Clairvaux, Tractatus de ordine vitae, c. VI, r. 21; ‘animus ad ima relabitur, nisi ad summa conetur,’ Gregory the 
Great, Liber Regulae Pastoralis, lib. 3, 34; and ‘aut ascendas necesse est, aut descendas. Si attendas stare, ruas 
necesse est. Minime, pro certo, est bonus, qui melior esse non vult. Et ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, ibi etiam 
defines esse bonus’, Bernardus of Clairvaux, letter 91, third paragraph. 
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legal order that was far from unified. Of course, these circumstances had their effect on a 
possible definition of the judge at the time.  
 
What did unify judges, though they might have worked under very different circumstances 
and spheres, are the following characteristics given by Garriga: regardless whether they worked 
within local, feudal or royal legal territories, all judges were ‘conveyors of a juridical structure 
that was essentially uniform, and that was guaranteed by ad hoc trials. It was by the virtue of 
these trials that the judges were integrated into one legal apparatus with one hierarchy based 
on the different stages of legal procedure.’18 This emphasizes once more that in a legal order 
as pluralistic as this, a lot of the credibility and authority of the judge’s decisions depended on 
judges’ professional and personal behaviour. Garriga has described this justice system as a 
‘justice of judges’.19 Hence it is not remarkable that Álvarez de Velasco directed his attention 
to all aspects of the judge’s persona, as the judge would indeed have needed to stand out from 
the flock, possessing extraordinary control over his passions and feelings to guarantee that he 
put his duty before personal interest.20 
This lack of legal or disciplinary rules on judges’ professional behaviour also means that 
scholarly works like that of Álvarez de Velasco must have carried quite some weight, as it is 
one of the few sources that dealt with this subject, and seems to have been the only one 
dedicated to this subject exclusively to have appeared within the 17th century Spanish empire. 
 
 
5. Citations of classical sources as organizing principle 
 
Now let us go back to the treatise. After the table of contents, which we will mention 
below, comes what we would call today an acknowledgment of sources: Álvarez de Velasco 
dedicates this page to a number of passages from classical sources that are of seminal 
importance for his work. He calls these citations the two descriptions of justice that show all 
aspects of justice excellently, as well as what the office of the judge entails and what makes a 
perfect judge.21 This validation of the cited works shows once more how tightly connected 
Álvarez de Velasco’s understandings of justice and of the role of the judge are, as we will see 
that these quotations in fact put the characteristics of the judge centre stage. 
 
The first citation is from Attic Nights (178-192) by Roman author Aulus Gellius (2nd 
century AD). This work is a miscellany that was written in the second century AD. It covered 
many subjects such as history, geography, philosophy and law, and gives special attention to 
linguistics and the relation between Greek and Roman culture.22 The citation here concerns 
                                                 
18 Garriga, “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe Du Ius Commune. 
(Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, p. 81, translation my own.  
19 Garriga, “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe Du Ius Commune. 
(Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, p. 79.  
20 Garriga, “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe Du Ius Commune. 
(Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, p. 81. 
21 ‘qua pulchre omnibus suis partibus constans ipsa depingitur, magistratus officium demonstrator et 
perfectus iudex constituitur.’ Of course these are not the only other classical writers who paid attention to the 
figure of the judge: the image of the ‘good’(bonus) and the ‘bad’ (malus) judge, for example were both elaborated 
on by both Seneca, in De beneficiis, and Ulpian, in the Digest of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (D. 1,1,10). Glass, X., 
“Das Gleichnis vom guten und schlechten Richter in Senecas de beneficiis und Ulpians Definition von 
Gerechtigkeit (D. 1, 1, 10),” forum historiae iuris, December 8, 2010, 
http://fhi.rg.mpg.de/media/zeitschrift/1012glass.pdf.  
22 Biographical information on Aulus Gellius from the Oxford Classics Dictionary, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195389661/obo-9780195389661-0200.xml.  
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another citation in itself on the depiction of justice, as given in a work called On beauty and 
pleasure by Chrysippus, a Greek member of the Stoa and a prolific writer:23  
 
‘That Chrysippus skilfully and vividly represented the likeness of Justice in melodious and 
picturesque language. 
‘Most worthily, by Heaven! and most elegantly did Chrysippus, in the first book of his work 
entitled On Beauty and Pleasure, depict the face and eyes of Justice, and her aspect, with austere and 
noble word-painting. For he ‘represents the figure of justice, and says that it was usually represented by 
the painters and orators of old in about the following manner: “Of maidenly form and bearing, with a 
stern and fearsome countenance, a keen glance of the eye, and a dignity and solemnity which was 
neither mean nor cruel, but awe-inspiring.” From the spirit of this representation he wished it to be 
understood that the judge, who is the priest of Justice, ought to be dignified, holy, austere, incorruptible, 
not susceptible to flattery, pitiless and inexorable towards the wicked and guilty, vigorous, lofty, and 
powerful, terrible by reason of the force and majesty of equity and truth.”24 
 
This quote is of importance here as the collection of characteristics of the judge it gives 
serves to provide the very structure of Álvarez de Velasco’s treatise: Álvarez de Velasco 
divided his treatise into fifteen rubricae, each of them dedicated to (a part of) one of the 
characteristics mentioned by Aulus Gellius, in the same order given in the quotation. His choice 
to use Gellius’ text as an organizing principle could be understood in de light of Gellius’ own 
career: though he was in fact a scholar, trained in grammar, rhetorics, and philosophy, he had 
also been a judge. Gellius had acted as a ‘unus iudex’, that is to say a lay judge appointed to 
adjudicate cases concerning money loans, and was known for this in the literature, for he had 
mentioned it in his Noctes Atticae.25 
 
Then comes a citation from the Bibliotheca Historica, a voluminous world history written 
by Diodorus Siculus, who lived in Sicily in the first century BC.26 It gives the following 
description of a hall in Egypt where justice was administered:  
 
‘In this hall there are many wooden statues representing parties in litigation, whose eyes are fixed 
upon the judges who decide their cases; and these, in turn, are shown in relief on one of the walls, to 
the number of thirty and without any hands, and in their midst the chief justice, with a figure of Truth 
hanging from his neck and holding his eyes closed, and at his side a great number of books. And these 
figures show by their attitude that the judges shall receive no gift and that the chief justice shall have 
his eyes upon the truth alone.’27  
 
This passage also mentions a number of the characteristics of the judge that Álvarez de 
Velasco will pay attention to in his work, and which might even be considered the most 
important (they will be elaborated on below): for they show that the judges as incorruptible, as 
they do not have hands to receive gifts with, and their chief has his eyes closed so he will not 
be distracted by any flattery and can direct his attention at serving justice only, led by truth. He 
                                                 
23 Gould, J.B., The Philosophy of Chrysippus, Leiden 1970, p. 7-14.  
24 Aulus Gellius, Noctium Aticarum libri XX, 4.4.1-5. Translation: The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. 
With An English Translation. John C. Rolfe. Cambridge, Mass. 1927.  
25 For Despite a lack of legal training, the praetores could appoint Roman men above the age of 25 and 
of substantial wealth, to act as unus iudex. Spruit, J.E., “Aulus Gellius als rechter. Een beschouwing over Gellius, 
Noctes Atticae xiv, 2”, Historische wortels van het recht (L. van den Berge, M. Neekilappillai, R. Kindt, and J. 
Valk, eds.), Nijmegen 2014, esp. p. 164.  
26 Biographical information on Diodorus Sicilus from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Diodorus-
Siculus.  
27 Siculus, Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, 1.48.6. Translation: Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica. 
Translated by Charles Henry Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library 303, Cambridge, Mass. 1935. 
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is also ‘surrounded by books’, implying that the judge is obedient to the prescribed rules, and 
aware of the fact that he does not reign alone in the kingdom of justice. Álvarez de Velasco 
dedicates the last rubrica to this being ‘surrounded by books.’  
 
Álvarez de Velasco writes that the citations show us the desired characteristics of the 
judge, and the rules that justice prescribes, but that most of them have remained hidden and 
deserve publication and discussion – which will be done with this work, thus enlightening man 
on earth.   
 
Then come the rubricae. Álvarez de Velasco thus treats each of the qualities of the judge 
individually, following Aulus Gellius’ list. This is not the only example known to us of a jurist 
using a very well-known, and in that sense classical work, as an organizing principle for his 
text: Gratian used one of St. Paul’s letters, the first one to Timothy (1. Tim. 3), for shaping part 
of the Distinctiones of his Decretum Gratiani.28  
 
Let us take a quick look at these rubrics, and what they teach us about the necessary 
qualities of the judge:29 
 
- Forma virginali: of maidenly form and bearing: this should be understood as the 
statement that the virtue of justice is the purest one of all and unites all other virtues.30 
It is thus regarded the most important virtue of all, which means that the judge, as its 
embodiment, ought to be ‘chaste’, which consists here in traits such as modesty, being 
a good keeper of secrets, and not having a desire for power or monetary gain.  
- Aspectu vehementi et formidabili: with a stern and fearsome countenance: this rubrica 
concerns the statement that the judge should always act from wisdom, keep a certain 
distance to others, that he should know that he cannot please all with his judgements, 
and that he should not be tempted by rumours or bribes to judge a certain way.  
- Luminibus oculorum acribus: with a keen glance of the eye: the judge should look 
inside himself first before he looks at the subjected, which is to mean that he should be 
aware of his own flaws when he observes and judges those of others.31 
- neque humilis neque atrocis … sed reverendae cuiusdam tristitiae dignitate: with a 
dignity and solemnity which is neither humble nor cruel, but fits someone who is awe-
inspiring: this is about the right amount of dignity for a judge; he should not be too 
submissive or humble, nor should he become arrogant (superbus)  
- Gravem: dignified: the judge should bear dignity with kindness and without arrogance  
                                                 
28 Lenherr, T. “Die ‘Glossa Ordinaria’ Zur Bibel Als Quelle von Gratians Dekret. Ein (neuer) Anfang”, 
Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 24 (2000), p. 110, with many thanks to prof. S. Dusil for pointing this parallelism 
out to me.  
29 On the requirements and restrictions for judges in this period, see also the Recopilación de leyes de los 
reinos de las Indias (Madrid, 1681), as noted by Czeguhn, I. “Richterbilder und Richterkulturen in Spanien und 
Lateinamerika”, forum historiae iuris, March 22 2011, http://fhi.rg.mpg.de/media/zeitschrift/1103czeguhn.pdf, 
fifth paragraph. The Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias sought to regulate the great power judges 
had in Peru by putting restrictions on their personal lives, for example forbidding them to own land or real estate 
or take part in funerals. Czeguhn describes how in response to incidents of power abuse judges, also in the overseas 
areas, were often kept quite isolated from the communities they worked in, see paragraph 12 and 13.  
30 ‘iustitia est virtutum praeclarissima, caeterarum mater,et nutrix, et ipsa est omnis virtus, seu omnes 
virtutes complectitur’, Rub. 1, summarium with adn.1, 5.  
31 ‘Iudex se prius lynceos oculeos convertat; in subditos inde. Quia iustus prior est accusator sui. Nec 
aliorum bene corrigit errata, qui non se prius iustitia sensura castigat.’ Rub. III, summarium, 2.  
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- Sanctum: holy, venerable: judges are ministers of God and have to shape and unite 
themselves according to Him, whose place they take on earth.32 In this rubrica judges 
are called priests.33  
- Severum: austere, strict: without strictness, justice could not be upheld,34 but it is 
possible, though difficult to combine strictness with mildness. 
- Incorruptum: incorruptible: on the receiving of gifts, on being insensitive to bribes, on 
cases of extortion and perjury. 
- Inadulabilem: not susceptible to flattery; on the extent to which a judge should avoid 
becoming subject to flattery. 
- Contraque improbos, nocentesque immisericordem: pitiless and inexorable towards 
the wicked and guilty: discusses the discretion for judges to apply stricter of more 
lenient punishments than the law prescribes, and how to justify such deviant 
punishments. 
- inexorabilem, erectum et arduum: vigorous, lofty, and powerful: whether a judge 
should be sensitive to supplications. 
- Potentem vi et maiestate … aequitatis, veritatisque terrificum: terrible by reason of the 
force and majesty of equity and truth: on deciding what equity demands, and how far a 
judge should go in finding the truth – could he find out the truth by tricks or ruses? 
Should he follow his own conscience in this?  
- Librorum cumulo circumstante: surrounded by books: on studying books to find what 
the law is, and on discussing laws extensively to decide what is just.  
 
We do not have space to discuss each quality more extensively here, but let us take a closer 
look at the way this part of the treatise was structured, as it tells us something about the 
intentions of the work. 
 
Álvarez de Velasco treats his subject matter the following way: each rubrica is comprised 
of different adnotationes, with every adnotatio, quite practically, answering a question related 
to the rubrica. The answers are comprised of orderly lists of citations from all kinds of works 
by church fathers and classical writers, just as we have seen in the letter to the reader. So, what 
Álvarez de Velasco merely does here is provide us with a collection of all the relevant passages 
from authoritative sources that answer the questions that he brings up. These questions must 
have been realistic in the exercising of the judge’s task at the time. There are for example 
questions about receiving payment by means of gifts from litigants,35 or if it is allowed for the 
judge to apply more lenient punishment to a friend brought before him in court.36 
 
 
6. Corruptibility  
 
What springs to the eye when studying the contents of this work is the amount of attention 
paid to questions concerning the corruptibility of judges. The rubrica dedicated to 
incorruptibility is by far the largest, and addresses questions such as: may judges accept gifts 
from friends involved in lawsuits that the judge will decide on? What if the gifts are very small? 
                                                 
32 ‘Iudices Dei ministri sunt, debentque ad similitudinem eius, cuius ministri sunt, vicesque gerunt, se 
formare et componere.’ Rub. VII, summarium with adn. 1, 1.  
33 ‘Iudices sacerdotes appellantur’, Rub. VII, summarium with adn. 1, 9.  
34 ‘Absque severitate iustitia stare non potest’, Rub. VIII, summarium, 2.  
35 Rub. X, adn. VII.  
36 Rub XI., adn. II.  
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Or from relatives? May they exchange gifts with members from other courts?37 The answer to 
most of these questions is negative. It is understandable that these questions came up quite 
frequently in real life, and thus had to be dealt with in this work. For the office of the judge 
was one that could be bought. As a side note, let us explain how this practice worked: in the 
Spanish Empire of Álvarez de Velasco’s time, there was a system of selling beneficio, or the 
sale of revocable appointments to non-inheritable offices. This system was beneficial for the 
monarchy, as it enabled the monarch to weaken the influence on patronage by the aristocracy 
and the jurists of the great councils that were connected to municipal oligarchies.38 It also meant 
that one could buy his way into power, which harmed Aquinas’ then-prevalent principle of 
distributive justice. Such buying of an appointment was thus seen, by the elite that upheld this 
notion, as innately corrupt: nothing good could come out of this, as the appointed officials had 
not proven their necessary merit, which in their eyes sprang naturally from the proper social 
origins that provided the qualities needed for the necessary virtuousness.39 This understanding 
of corruption, which was closely tied to the practice of being judicial offices, clashed with yet 
another notion of corruption that rose in this time, as has been identified by Rosenmüller: it is 
the then-novel idea of corruption as divergence of royal laws for self-benefit, and it was 
favoured by the crown and social newcomers who benefitted from the appointment system.40  
 
So it becomes clear from this background that less than noble interests might have sparked 
some to become interested in the office of the judge – the desire to obtain societal power and 
fulfil nepotistic interests must have felt within reach. It is this dynamic that Álvarez de Velasco 
addresses here, by reminding judges to never forget the common good and to be aware that 
eventually, they themselves will be tried by God.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
We have seen what qualities Álvarez de Velasco assigned to the good judge and how he 
perceived the tasks that were part of the judge’s office. We would like to remark here that this 
treatise is not thought to have stood on its own, in the sense that the image of the justice system 
as a justice of judges was indeed a shared one, and it was after this work that Marcus Antonius 
Sabelli, a prestigious jurist at the grand duchy of Tuscany, wrote his Compendium de 
qualitatibus iudicis perfecti ex non minus eleganti, quam obstruso tratatu D. Gabriel Aluarez. 
De Velasc. de iud. perfect. per tot. (Venice, 1697)41  
 
We will conclude with the remark that this work, in being a ‘mirror for judges’, had two 
intentions: it was meant to provide the audience with an ideal type or theoretical model of the 
judge’s deontology, and to show judges an exemplary image of good behaviour and perfect 
                                                 
37 Rub. IX, adn. I-X.  
38 Rosenmüller, C., “‘Corrupted by Ambition’: Justice and Patronage in Imperial New Spain and Spain, 
1650–1755”, Hispanic American Historical Review 96, 1 (2016), p. 2.  
39 This principle prescribed that one’s worthiness as a person decided one’s societal rewards – 
appointments being part of these rewards: the worthier or nobler of character a person, the more societal rewards 
he deserved. Rosenmüller, C., “‘Corrupted by Ambition’: Justice and Patronage in Imperial New Spain and Spain, 
1650–1755, p. 5.  
40 Interestingly, they also favoured performance and education as selection criteria over the social origins 
of a candidate. Rosenmüller, “‘Corrupted by Ambition’: Justice and Patronage in Imperial New Spain and Spain, 
1650–1755”, p. 28. 
41 Garriga, “Iudex Perfectus. Ordre Traditionnel et Justice de Juges Dans l’Europe Du Ius Commune. 
(Couronne de Castille, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)”, p. 85.  
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control over desires.42 Secondly, it was intended as an image of judges as they were, a reflection 
of the real comportment of judges and the questions and difficulties they could meet in 
exercising their tasks (though it mostly concerned the higher placed judges who served as an 
example for the lower ones, and who were meant to correct mistakes committed by inferiors).43 
This two-sidedness makes the treatise particularly interesting for studying the understood 
responsibilities of the judge in this time. On a final note, it should be said that the conclusions 
drawn above should be understood as provisionary, as this is still a work in progress. 
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